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**Conventional Implicatures**

**Iftikhar Haider Nagra, Ph.D. Student**

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*Conventional implicature remains a controversial domain. While it continues to be invoked to handle non-truth conditional aspects of lexical meaning, this tends to constitute an admission of analytic failure, a label rather than true explanation of the phenomenon in question. (Horn, 2004: 6)*

***Conventional Implicature: A controversial Term***

This paper discusses and highlights different aspects of conventional implicatures (CIs). *Conventional Implicature* is a highly controversial term that is viewed in different ways by different pragmatics theorists. According to Horn (2004), CI can be defined as, an implicature that is part of the stored meaning of a lexical item or expression in the mental lexicon. CIs are not part of the truth conditions of the sentence that contains it, and they cannot be derived from the principles of language use, i.e. they are independent of the cooperative principle and its maxims (Grice, 1975).

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## **The Roots of the Concept**

Many theorists in the field of pragmatics hold different views about conventional implicature. The roots of this concept can be traced back to the work of Locke and Frege. Grice was a pioneer who introduced the term conventional implicature, and due to his initial work this term gained some popularity among other theorists. Grice failed to provide a clear definition of this class of meaning, and similarly failed to elaborate upon whether it is part of semantics or pragmatics. This lack of information about Grice's take on conventional implicatures has given rise to contradictory views by different theorists. According to Feng (2010), Grice's treatment of conventional implicatures is "incoherent, inadequate and thus vulnerable" (2010: 74).

This paper will discuss details of different theories about conventional implicatures to help us understand the views of those who accept or reject Grice's traditional conception of CIs.

Bach and Carston rejected Grice's original view of CIs. On the other hand Potts did not totally reject the original view of Grice, but did attempt to explain it in different words and attempted to redefine it. Potts (2005) considers CIs to consist of the "idiosyncratic properties of grammar". Potts used Grice's definition as a point of departure for developing his own logic of conventional implicatures by including some new conventional expressions. Salmon approves of Potts's view and considers it to be a step forward from Grice's original conception of CIs. Furthermore, Salmon (2009) discusses data regarding CIs which aligns with his conception of this concept with the Gricean system. Horn also shares the same opinion about CIs in that he also supports the Gricean conception of CI. Although all of these theorists somehow criticized the Gricean view of CIs, their alternatives to Grice's view also have problems of their own. I will discuss these theorists in detail in the next section.

## **Preliminaries in the Theory of Conventional Implicatures**

Frege's (1952[1892]) ideas related to his distinction between 'reference' and 'sense' laid the foundations for the development of the concept of CIs. Frege emphasized that sometimes meaning may go beyond reference and sense but did not say anything about how such situations contribute to the total meaning of the utterances. Horn (2007) has spent a considerable amount of time discussing the contributions of Frege to the traditional conception of Conventional

Implicatures. But Grice was the pioneer who used the term Conventional Implicatures in his popular paper, “Logic and conversation” (Grice, 1961).

Grice contrasted between conversational and conventional implicatures, and used the popular example of “she is poor but honest” (Bach, 1999, p.330) to elaborate on the notion of CIs. This example implies that there is contrast between being poor and being honest. Grice (1961) discussed this contrast using the words, “implied as distinct from being stated” (p.127).

Let us consider another utterance, “she is poor and honest”. If we compare these two utterances then it is obvious that the truth of the first utterance requires nothing more than the truth of the second utterance. The only difference is that by uttering the first utterance instead of the second one, the speaker implicates contrast. In simple words, being an implicature means that the truth of first utterance is not a necessary condition for the truth of second utterance.

### **Reliance on Specific Meaning of Specific Words**

There are certain words in sentences which contribute to the specific conventional meaning and results in conventional implicature. Conventional implicature relies on the specific meaning of these specific words in a sentence. Popular examples of such words include *but*, *even* and *still*. The notion that such words are not parts of ‘what is said’. Grice discussed such words to the effect that CIs do not have any influence on the truth and falsity conditions of ‘what is said’. This clearly shows that CIs are not truth conditional. In other words, locutions that carry CIs can generate implicatures on the basis of their conventional meaning.

### **Conversational Implicature vs. Conventional Implicature**

Potts (2005) asserts that the lack of clarity of Grice’s discussion makes it challenging to show that CIs constitute a distinct class of meaning. Grice did not describe CIs as a class of meaning, but rather as a way to clarify the features or properties of Conversational Implicatures.

If we compare CIs and conversational implicatures we can find some distinct differences by using the three properties of calculability, detachability, and cancelability.

These three main properties constitute Grice’s test for distinguishing Conventional Implicature from Conversational Implicature.

According to Grice, CIs are not “calculable,” which differentiate them from conversational implicatures. Conversational Implicatures are calculable because they rely on the

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assumption that what is said does not suffice to engender the implicature. As regards Conventional Implicature, calculation is not needed as the implicature is already given in the form of some conventional expression which has specific meaning.

Conventional Implicature is “detachable,” whereas conversational implicature is “not detachable.” For example, if we use a different locution to express the same meaning, the conventional meaning cannot be maintained.

The final property discussed by Grice as a mark of distinction between conventional and conversational implicature is Cancelability. Conversational implicatures are cancellable whereas conventional implicatures are not cancellable. The conventional meaning of conventional implicatures is encoded in the expression that gives rise to a certain additional meaning. That is, the conventional meaning is part of the stored meaning in the mental lexicon.

Grice did not provide a detailed description of his notion of conventional implicature. He did not describe conventional implicature as a class of meaning, but rather as a way to clarify the properties of conversational implicature. Furthermore, Grice did not clarify whether conventional implicature is part of semantics or pragmatics.

This limited fragmented information about conventional implicature as a separate class of meaning results in different kinds of reformulations to the point where it has become difficult to differentiate conventional implicature from other classes of meaning. This may be one possible reason for the divided opinion that exists among later theorists attempting to develop Grice’s ‘provisional fragmentary discussions of conventional implicature into a theory’ (Feng, 2010, p.3).

### **Bach’s (1999a) Rejection of Grice’s Theory of Conventional Implicatures**

Bach offers a strong critique of the Gricean notion of CIs and rejects them by asserting “Grice’s category of conventional implicature throws a monkey wrench into his distinction between what is said and what is implicated” (1999a: 327). Bach finds the Gricean notion of conventional implicature problematic, and criticizes Grice for creating difficulties as a result of his effort to relate his notion of conventional implicature to his distinction between what is said and what is implicated. Here Bach argues that conventional implicature is derived from the meaning of particular expressions rather than from conversational circumstances. Bach offers

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his solution to removing this ‘monkey wrench’ from the Gricean frame work of conventional implicature.

Bach observed in 1999 that propositions that contain expressions of CIs, e.g. *but*, *even*, and *still* are part of ‘what is said,’ so such propositions cannot be considered to be CIs. He calls these conventional expressions as ‘preservative operators’ (‘give rise to a new proposition and at the same time they preserve the original meaning’) and contends that they affect the truth conditions of sentences. Bach argues that locutions which are not part of ‘what is said’ do not necessarily generate conventional implicature as the same is true for utterance modifiers such as “confidentially” and “in other words”. Furthermore, such expressions generate new propositions and simultaneously keep /preserve the original meaning.

Bach criticized CIs because the rationale behind the existence of CI is not strong. He believes that this concept is based on the intuition that “the falsity of this proposition is compatible with the truth of what is said; hence that this proposition is not part of what is said” (Bach 1999, p.338).

Bach considered the category of conventional implicatures to be redundant as expressions like *but*, *even* and *therefore* can be incorporated into the new category of indirect quotations. Bach further asserted that any linguistic expression which passes his indirect quotation test is part of ‘what is said’. Bach further elaborates about IQ-test in these words:

An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said (Bach, 1999, p.340).

The following examples further illustrate Bach’s point:

- (1) a. Shaq is huge *but* he is agile.  
b. Marv said that Shaq is huge *but* that he is agile.
- (2) a. *Even* Shaq can make some free throws.  
b. Marv said that *even* Shaq can make some free throws.

These examples illustrate how some conventional expressions such as *but* and *even* occur as a part of indirect quotations. Bach asserts when a speaker utters ACIDS (Alleged Conventional Implicatures Devices) then the speaker is committed to another proposition which is not part of what is said. He treats ACIDS as a part of what is said. In addition, ACIDS pass the IQ-test which is discussed above. In a nutshell, Bach believes that CIs do not exist in natural language and he discussed four factors by focusing on *but* as a case study. He believes that these four factors ‘conspire’ to create this category of Conventional Implicatures (Bach, 1999a, 343-350).

These four factors are given below:

- 1) It (but) doesn’t encode a unique contrastive relation as its import varies across different contexts.
- 2) The contrast indicated by *but* is often common ground which is not part of what speaker is asserting.
- 3) People are usually forced to judge an utterance containing *but* as true or false.
- 4) It (but) usually requires an extra clause to spell out its contribution.

Bach’s conception of CIs has its own problems. First, I think that his IQ-test is not very reliable. Bach’s IQ test claims that any element which can be embedded in an indirect quotation contributes to what is said. This is applicable to the English language with some exceptions. Hall (2004) and Carston (2002) questioned the reliability of Bach’s IQ test even for the English language. Carston provides example sentences based on indirect reports as a means of proving her point. One example appears below:

- (3) Beth said that frankly she had had enough of John’s lies.

If Carston is correct about the acceptability of above sentence then Bach’s test appears to be unreliable. I am uncertain whether Bach’s test is reliable in some other languages.

### **Evidence from Non-English Languages – Punjabi and Urdu**

If I think of my native languages Urdu and Punjabi, these languages have certain elements which can be embedded in indirect quotations, as asserted by Bach, but they do not contribute anything to what is said. According to Feng (2010), the IQ-test is too rigid as it ignores some of the background beliefs about speaker and hearer.

In a nutshell, Bach argues that the conventional meaning of locutions such as ‘but’ is part of what is said. I think that Bach offers a rational analysis of conventional implicature. If I translate the popular example of Grice “she is poor but honest” into Urdu, which is my native language, then, in my point of view, contrast does not appear to be implicated, and instead it is part of what is said.

### **Relevance Theorists’ Rejection of CIs**

Relevance theorists disagree with the alternatives provided by Bach, and also believe that there is no such thing as Conventional Implicature. Carston’s (2002) views are that CIs were based on Blackmore’s (1987) assertion that a conjoined utterance generates two propositions which play parallel inferential roles. Relevance theorists treat conventional expressions such as *but* and *therefore* as “coded means for constraining the inferential tasks involved in utterance interpretation” (Blackmore, 2002:89).

Many relevance theorists consider that expressions such as *but* and *fortunately* trigger higher level explicatures (Wilson and Sperber, 1993; Blackmore, 2002; Carston, 2002). Carston (2007) also discussed the structure of utterances that contain *and*. Carston asserted that, according to the communicative principle of Relevance, “a presumption of optimal relevance is conveyed by very act of ‘ostensive’ (overt) communication” (p.574).

Relevant theorists’ use of ‘ostensive’ also supports their assertion that the meaning of contrast in expressions such as *but* generate explicatures rather than implicatures. This can be elaborated with the help of the following example:

(4) Hermoine is very beautiful, and she comes from a wealthy family.

The above sentence communicates conjoined proposition [p&q] along with what is expressed by the individual conjuncts [p] and [q]. So in (5) ‘what is said’ includes both [p] and [q] along with what might be understood as an implicature of Hermoine being lucky to be both beautiful and from a wealthy family. According to relevance theorists the additional meaning of (5) is part of the semantic meaning and is already encoded. Their primary concern is the different explicatures it might generate.

Carston (2002) also discusses certain other expressions such as *therefore*, *after all*, and *you see* as being constraints on the hearer's processing cost. She further claims that such constraints are procedural "effort saving device[s] one would expect to feature in a code which is subservient to a relevance-driven processing mechanism, which is geared to driving, cognitive effects at least cost to the processing resources of the system" (Carston, 2002:162).

Carston concluded that an utterance containing *but* does not generate Conventional Implicature of contrast but it can generate an explicature of contrast. Furthermore, relevance theorists asserted that they have little concern about whether or not the extra meaning in the utterances is part of the truth conditions of the utterances, which is contrary to the Gricean criteria for Implicature.

Some relevance theorists assert that expressions such as *in other words*, *for example*, *frankly*, *unfortunately*, *confidentially* and many others, are "external to the truth conditional proposition but contribute content to higher level explicatures" (Wilson and Sperber, 1995, cited in Feng,2010). In order to illustrate their point, consider the following examples:

- (6) a. Mary to Peter: Sadly, I cannot help you to find a job.  
b. Mary cannot help Peter to find job.  
c. Mary is sad that she can't help Peter to find a job.

Wilson and Sperber (1995) emphasize that one utterance can have many explicatures. For instance, in the above example, 6b is the basic level explicature and 6c is the higher level explicature. In a nutshell, relevance theoretic analysis has developed a thought-provoking inquiry into the nature of Conventional Implicatures. However, it is also problematic in certain respects. Blakemore (2002) claims that Grice's account of conventional implicature is a standard speech act account. She discusses the case of *but* as indicating to her as speech act. She mentions Grice's proposal that conventional implicatures should be analyzed as second order speech acts. I think that Blakemore's assumption is wrong, and regard it as an exaggeration to claim that Grice intended to analyze CIs as traditional speech acts. Grice did talk about higher-order speech acts such as contrasting, adding and explaining but these speech acts differ from traditional speech acts as postulated by Austin (1962) and Searle (1979). Blakemore's criticism of Grice's notion of CI is thus not realistic.



## Potts: Reexamination of Grice's Theory of Conventional Implicature

Potts does not reject this classical notion. However, he has taken certain steps to develop the logic of CIs by using Grice's (1975) ideas as his point of departure. Potts (2005) ignores Grice's original examples of *but* and *therefore* and includes several new expressions, e.g., relative clauses, nominal appositives, sentence adverbials, expressive epithets, expressive attributive adjectives and honorifics.

Let us examine some of Potts' examples and elaborate on how he perceives CIs.

(7) Lance Armstrong, *a Texan*, has won the 2002 Tour de France.

(8) The *damn* electric clothes dryer didn't come with an electric plug!

Potts states conventional implicature in (7) is expressed by using a nominal appositive '*a Texan*', in (8) the same idea is expressed by using the expressive attributive adjective *damn*. Potts further asserts that these two expressions are grammatically different but both are speaker-oriented entailments and independent of 'at-issue' entailment. Potts (2005) used the term "at-issue" to indicate the descriptive meaning instead of the Gricean notion of 'what is said.' Potts' descriptive meaning is similar to the manner in which Karttunen and Peters (1979) explain 'implicative verbs' such as *manage* and *fail*. This is elaborated in the example below.

(9) Bart managed to pass the test.

Descriptive: Bart passed the test.

Conventional Implicature: Bart tried hard to pass the test.

Potts claims that such utterance gives rise to two possible meanings: what is said (descriptive) and what is implicated. Moreover, 'at issue' is the main theme of an utterance while conventional implicature is a secondary entailment. Potts claims that CI is used either to guide the discourse in a particular direction or used to help the hearer better understand why the 'at-issue' content is important at that stage. With this in mind, the above examples can be used as discussion points for generating two possible meanings, descriptive meaning akin to what is said and what is implicated. In (7) the descriptive meaning is that Lance Armstrong has won the 2002 Tour de France and the CI is that Lance Armstrong is a Texan. In (8) the expression *damn* is adding extra meaning to the effect that the speaker is unhappy with not having gotten a plug with his electric clothes dryer. So Potts allowed certain new expressions to become parts of CIs.

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Potts (2007) has used the three principles of calculability, malleability, and reinforceability to differentiate between Conventional Implicatures and Conversational Implicatures. Potts further elaborated on his three principles using the following examples:

(10)a. What city does Sam live in?

b. I know he lives in France.

This example reflects that the speaker needs to make some calculations in order to infer exactly where Sam lives. Potts (2007) asserts that conversational Implicatures are malleable because their meaning changes according to the current context. However, this is not true for Conventional Implicatures because context doesn't matter for CIs. CIs have a fixed meaning regardless of the context in which they appear.

The third principle which distinguishes between conversational and Conventional Implicatures is the reinforceability of Conversational Implicatures. This indicates CI also depends on the speakers if they want to generate a Conversational Implicature or not.

Another important distinction is Potts' (2007) distinction between Conventional Implicatures and presuppositions. He claims that when linguists describe them, their description usually matches with presuppositions which results in a 'confusing history'. He further asserts that CIs are redundant and their content cannot be repeated. Potts (2007) explains that an utterance can generate both descriptive meaning and Conventional Implicatures and it is thus important to differentiate between these two layers of meaning. Moreover, CIs are inert assertorically and scope wise. This means that by denying the conventional implicature provided by the parenthetical in (7) it will automatically deny the entire proposition, and not just the content in the parenthetical. Potts provided certain examples in order to elaborate on these arguments. These examples provide good factual supports to the notion of Conventional Implicatures. I think he has been successful in developing a convincing logic for his take on CIs. However, his work remains imperfect, and some theorists have questioned his approach to CIs by pointing out some of the problems.

Feng (2010) argues that, "Pott's logic is a misnomer rather than a Gricean development" (p.69). Feng agrees with Potts's assertion that the evidence in Grice's work for CIs is meager, but he criticized Potts for not rooting his logic in the work of Grice. Potts himself has claimed

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that his work is based on Kattunen and Peters (1979) rather than Grice (1961, 1975, 1989). Analyzing the work of Potts makes it clear that he accepts the existence of CIs, but his new focus on different conventional expressions appears quite different in comparison with the actual concerns regarding the Gricean framework of CIs. Some of the new conventional expressions that Potts introduced contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they appear. This is contrary to what Grice thinks about CIs as being non-truth conditional. If we consider example (7) as discussed above, it is clear that it expresses two propositions. That means that anyone who utters (7) says something false if even one of the two propositions is false. Neal (2001) claims that utterances such as (7) express two propositions. If both of utterances are false then such an utterance is clearly false. However, if only one utterance is false, then Neal didn't say anything whether it is false or true.

Proposition1. Lance Armstrong has won the 2002 Tour de France.

Proposition2. Lance Armstrong is a Texan.

Feng (2010) believes that Potts claim of CIs as being 'always speaker oriented' is very rigid for two reasons. First, there is weak support for this claim made by Potts and second Potts's test of speaker orientation is unreliable. Feng cites some of the examples that contain parenthetical adverbs from Potts's work which are not speaker-oriented to illustrate his argument. Let us examine one such example:

(11) Bill entered his room. *Unfortunately*, it had been burgled.

In (11) the parenthetical adverb reflects the comment of Bill, who thinks it is unfortunate that the room had been burgled as well as showing that Potts's test of speaker orientation is unreliable. In a nutshell, Potts's work is a good addition to the literature on CIs but his work does not involve Gricean development because he did not include classical insights regarding CIs in his analysis. Feng (2010) claims that Potts is right to claim that the meaningfulness of the conventional implicature dimension is not dependent on the truth and falsity of the at-issue dimension but it is incompatible with Grice's original motivation. Grice intends CI to be truth conditional and dependent upon what is said, and this dependency is one of the defining characteristics of Grice's view of CIs.

### **Salmon's Theory of Double Subject Sentence and New Conventional Implicatures**

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While supporting the existence of CIs, Salmon (2009) claim that Potts's (2005) speaker-oriented criterion failed to address Double Subject Sentences (DSS). According to Salmon, DSSs involve a dislocation construction that appears in the spoken variety of Brazilian Portuguese Vernacular (BPV). He cited a few examples of DSS at the beginning of his paper:

(12) Esse Presidente, o imposto esta cada vez mais alto.

‘This president, taxes are getting higher and higher.’

(13) O Lulu presidente, Voce acha que as coisas estao melhorando?

‘Lulu [being] president, do you think things are getting better’?

In the above examples, one common feature is that the main sentence is preceded by a parenthetical constituent. Salmon calls this constituent noun phrase one (NP1). Salmon explains that NP1 should meet certain conditions. For example, it should exhibit part whole relationship with the main sentence, and its meaning should be referential or generic. Salmon reviewed some of the problematic aspects of Potts's speaker-oriented approach in indirect speech with specific reference to DSS. He claims that DSSs are main clause phenomena which cannot be reported in indirect speech. This condition is also an important part of Bach's IQ test. However, this condition of Bach's IQ test does not hold for Potts own data, so Salmon assigned a special category to CIs discussed by Potts as being “New Conventional Implicatures” (NCI). Salmon discussed four points concerning NCIs and these appear below:

1. [N]CIs are part of the conventional meaning of words.
2. [N]CIs are commitment and thus give rise to entailments.
3. These commitments are made by the speaker of the utterance ‘by virtue of the meaning of’ the words he chooses.
4. [N]CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is ‘said (in the favored sense)’, i.e. independent of the at-issue entailments. (P. 56)

Salmon asserts that it is the 3<sup>rd</sup> requirement which gives rise to NCIs. Salmon reviews the above requirements in his paper by contending that DSS aligns with all of the traits of NCIs. As regards the very first requirement given above, meaning (1), he claims that the meaning of the NP1 of the DSS relies on the lexical constituent of the noun phrase. As regards the second requirement, what is stated in the NP1 is a commitment, and it creates entailment. This

requirement clearly accepts the semantic contribution of NP1. The third requirement concerns all how it is difficult for the DSS to elaborate on how commitments are made by the speaker. The fourth requirement states that the meaning of CIs is distinct from ‘what is said’. Salmon further elaborated on these requirements using examples such as the one given below:

(14). Illinois, tornado e muito comum.

‘In Illinois, tornadoes are very common.’

Salmon highlighted that in the above example the content of NP1 is independent of the content of ‘what is said.’ This means that the speaker may deny the statement ‘tornadoes are very common’ without denying ‘in Illinois’. This argument appears to be a bit problematic because in using our language we usually consider both as being necessary for successful communication.

One of the highlights of Salmon’s work is his claim that DSSs can easily fit into the Gricean framework of CIs. He enumerated all of the properties of CIs as being part of DSS e.g., non-cancellable, detachable, and non-truth conditionals. We can analyze the above example (12) in the light of Salmon’s comparison of DSS and CIs. According to Salmon’s framework in (12) holds that the primary utterance will be true even if we delete NP1 because truth and falsity of ‘what is said’ will not be affected by this change. Furthermore, NP1 does not play any role in terms of the properties of CIs, i.e., calculability, cancellability, and detachability.

Consider the following example:

(15) O apartment, as garrafas de cerveja estavam por toda a parte.

The apartment, beer bottles were everywhere.

Salmon claims that the truth or falsity of ‘what is said’ in the DSS above is not affected by the truth or falsity of the initial NP. He went on to add that the latter simply contributes to the hearer’s comprehension of the DSS, and the deletion of the initial NP thus would not affect the speaker’s assertion that ‘beer bottles are everywhere’. This shows that the primary utterance is true even if the initial NP is absent. So, the NP1 does not have any share in terms of calculability.

On the other hand the DSS is detachable, because the content of DSS cannot be expressed using other expressions that have same truth conditional content. As mentioned above, this approach presents some problems because it seems a bit unusual to claim that deleting NP1 in (13) would not affect the truth or falsity of ‘what is said’. I think that in (12) the presence of NP1 makes a clear difference as regards the meaning of the entire utterance, so NP1 should have some sort of impact with respect to truth or falsity.

### **Grice meets Frege in Horn’s Theory of Conventional Implicature**

Horn’s framework offers strong support for Grice’s traditional views of CIs. Horn (2007) attaches a great deal of importance to the work of Frege, and devotes a considerable portion of his paper to Frege’s classification of three relations. These three relations are known as: *Voraussetzung* (presupposition), *Nebengedanke* (side-thought, which relates to Grice’s notion of ‘what is said’) and *Andeutung* (Grice’s notion of ‘what is implicated’). Horn asserted that French-language T/V pronoun choices in French can provide factual support for CIs. He illustrated his claim with using the following example:

(16) a- Tu es soul

‘You (sing) are drunk’

b. Vous etes soul.

‘You (plural) are drunk’

Horn asserts that both (16a) and (16b) generate the same proposition in terms of ‘what is said’ but they differ in terms of their conventional meanings. I agree that this claim of Horn as speaker may opt for T or V based not on their truth conditions, but rather on assessment of social context (Levinson, 1983). Social indicators, for example, social distance, also contribute to this type of implicatures. It appears that these honorifics give rise to context dependent implicature.

Horn also highlighted CIs in relation to the distinction between definites and indefinites. Horn discussed the work of Russell (1905) and Abbot (2003) as support his claim that definites can generate conventional meanings of uniqueness and maximality. Russell (1905) claims that definiteness asserts existence and indefiniteness asserts both existence and uniqueness. Abbot (2003) suggests that the difference between indefinites and definites lies in the ability of the definites to generate the conventional implicature. Horn elaborated his claim using examples

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which show that definite descriptions cannot be deemed as being true or false based on their uniqueness and maximality. He then discussed how uniqueness is not cancellable, so uniqueness offers strong support for the Gricean traditional conception of CIs.

In a nutshell, Horn presented logical evidence that supports conventional implicatures, such as definiteness, which gives rise to an additional meaning. I think that we still need more research to confirm whether or not this additional meaning is part of what is said or part of conventional meaning which is stored in the mental lexicon. In my opinion, the additional meaning of uniqueness and maximality is part of what is said and cannot be considered to be a CI.

## Conclusion

Although the notion of CI traces its roots back to work of Locke and Frege, it was introduced into pragmatic theory by Grice. Various pragmatic theorists ranging from Grice to new Griceans and relevance theorists shed light on this notion. They either support the traditional views of Grice or reject his views. This paper has discussed some of these views about CIs. Bach and Carston is representative of those who categorically reject the existence of CIs whereas Salmon and Horn show support for CIs. Potts provides some support for the notion of CIs, but he created his own analytical framework for examining CIs.

This paper's discussion examines the controversy about CIs among different groups of theorists. More research is needed before a consensus about this controversial notion of Conventional Implicatures can develop more fully.

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