ECP Is Dead, Long Live ECP!

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1. INTRODUCING ABHAVA IN SENTENTIAL ONTOLOGY

Primarily, I faced a problem with the bound morheme –Ta in the Bangla sentences like

1. Korchis***Ta*** ki?

   do-pr.cont-(-Hon)-classifier what?

2. korcho***Ta*** ki?

   do-pr.cont-(+-Hon) classifier what?

3. korchen***Ta*** ki?

   do-pr.cont-(+Hon) classifier what?

4. Hocche ***Ta*** ki ?

   happen-pr.cont- classifier what?

In all these cases bound morpheme ''*Ta*'' is lonely as it is not a part of the preceding verbs which have already got inflections and thus are closed though orthographically ''*Ta*'' is written with those verb. In all these cases *wh*-object is missing as the speaker of these sentences does not

have the cognition of that *wh*-object or otherwise s/he is cognizing the absence. The second possibility is that s/he may have the pragmatic competence of cognizing that *wh*-object but s/he is pretending to be an ignorant, i.e. s/he has a cognition of absence of absence which is otherwise a presence, though *Raghunatha* argued that absence of absence is a new category other than that of presence.

This phenomenon can structurally be interpreted by the ECP. However, for the time being, keeping aside the ECP, we will try to understand this absence by deploying the *Nyaya-Vaisesika (NV)* category called "**abhava**". In the *Nyaya-Vaiseska* tradition, *padarthas* (categories) are distinguished on the basis of their presence (*bhava*) and absence (*abhava*). They considered both the existence and non-existence as categories which are subject to the knowledge or cognition by means of *savikalpa pratyaksa*, generic perception propositional knowledge.

Generally, in the English translations of the NV-literature, this category comes under the notion of negation and its subdivisions are translated as "relational absence" (*samsargabhava*) and "mutual absence" or "difference" (*anyonyabhava*). This paper mainly concentrates on the "relational absence" or simply absence rather than that of difference.

All relations are regarded in *Navyanyaya* as dyadic relations between two terms: *anuyogin* (referend, qualificand, locus X) and *pratiyogin* (counter-positive, referent, qualifier, located Y). Relation (R) is always a property resident in the residence or referend. Thus one can say X –(R-Y) where X is the locus of absence of Y where R is a relata.

In case of relational absence, a qualifier qualifies a qualificand and by negating it we get an "absence of that qualifier" (which is another qualifier) qualifying the same qualificand, "this ground X is qualified by pot-absence Y". On the other hand, difference is referred to as "this is not pot" type of negation. Thus absence of potness and difference from a pot are two distinguishable sub-categories of *abhava*.

This relational absence is further subdivided into three types, viz. Prior-absence (*pragabhava*), posterior-absence or destruction (*pradhamsabhava*) and constant absence (*atyantabhava*). These subdivisions are not thoroughly maintained in the following exposition.

In case of prior-absence, the absence is prior to the existence of effect or *pratiyogi* (counter-positive, which denotes absence of something or absential adjunct). Examples 1-4 are the perfect examples of this absence as the locus (*anuyogi*) adjacent to classifier –Ta is qualified by the absence of the qualifier or counter-positive wh-object. The very existence of ''*wh*'' triggers the yet to be known counter-positive. In case of such absential cognition, the counter-positive is floating as qualifier in the locus or qualificand. Nyaya called qualificand as subject and qualifier (*visesana*) as the property derived from the qualifier or *visesana* in the predicate. For example, in the expression "red cup", qualifier red colour is residing in the qualificand cup and both of them are limited by the blue-ness and cup-ness respectively. Thus blue-ness or cup-ness is the limiter under the mode of which the awareness of the cognition of absence occurs.

This prior absence or *pragabhava* is marked by the feature (*–adi* or 'origin,' +*anta* or 'end'), because after answering the questions 1-4 one can make an end of prior absence.

Any moved element that leaves behind a trace in the locus may be considered, for the time being, a case of posterior absence. The open question as posited by Chomsky, Lasnik(1991:21) that whether a moved element actually leaves behind a trace or not can be solved by an independent reason of posterior absence which, by assigning the absential qualifier to the locus of empty anuyogi, points out the once-upon-a-time cognition of existence of the counter-positive. An NP-trace is an instance of posterior-absence. In the terms of NV, the *samskara* or trace of moved element can be cognized in the locus from where the counter-positive is moved.

Thus the "trace of X" can be interpreted in the chain of (*pratiyogi, anuyogi* or qulifier, qualificand or counter-positive, locand, locus) X, t or binder-bindee relation. What Matilal (1966) called as L-relation or sub-superstratum is also a relation between locus and counter-positive or bindee-binder relation or the association of an antecedent with the trace. The

antecedent binder "John" as a counter-positive binds the locus of e (or antecedent c-commands t) as in

5. John was e_2 expected [e_1 to hurt himself].

By assigning absential qualifier, I want to emphasise the fact that any case of chain like (John, t) is not to be interpreted as only a simple case of "copy and delete" but a case of a definite locus-counter-positive relation or L-relation. If the locus's (where trace occurs) being the absence of counter-positive amounts to the locus's being the object referred by the word 'absence', that is occasioned by a prior cognition of the counter-positive, then whenever the locus is to be understood as an absence of counter-positive, it will be such an object, and whenever it is understood to be such an object, it will be such an absence. The use of word is subject to the prior understanding of the basis for its employment. And the basis for the employment of the expression "absence of counter-positive" is but the property of being an absence of counter-positive. It must be mentioned here that this whole notion of absence is taken from Gangesa's (14th C) "*abhavavada*", where a *navyanyaya* exposition of the property "absence" is defined transparently.

In another case of posterior *abhaba*, the counter-positive is destroyed and the counter-positive is responsible for this type of *abhava*. In case of

6. *Srimati* expected to PRO hurt herself.

PRO is a locus or *anuyogi* of the counter-positive or antecedent *Srimati*. It may be called posterior absence where lexical element is destroyed and thus contraction is possible, e.g. in case of wanna-contraction. PRO is always controlled by its counter-positive, though, according to some schools of *Nyaya*, it lacks the *pratiyogitaavacchedaka sambandha*. The relation between PRO and its locus is *samyoga* or conjunction. This posterior absence is marked by the feature *(+adi, -anta),* i.e. it has a definite origin, but it lacks the end.

Posterior absence is also found in the case of pro in Null subject languages or pro-drop languages like Italian, where pronominal is dropped or destroyed though the *anuyogi* or the locus of that counter-positive is there. The property of counter-positive is reflected in the *Agr* or phi-features in those pro-drop languages.

In case of constant absence, the empty terms like "*bandhyaputra*" (Son of a barren woman) or "*pokkhiraj ghora*" (The horse with wings like the king of birds) are produced. Here properties of one counter-positive is absent in another locus. Russell opined such empty terms and the notion of selectional restrictions depends on the violation of constant absence in general. This absence is marked by the feature *(-adi, -anta).* All the binary features for distinguishing one phoneme to another also depends on difference or *anyonyabhava*.

2. ABHAVA ELABORATED

I want to add here some more NV–notions that are mainly derived from *Navyanyaya*. *Abhava* is distinguished on the basis of
A. Differences of counter-positives
B. Differences of property of counter-positives
C. Differences of delimiting relation of counter-positiveness

A denotes the differences between the absence of chair from the absence of table; **B** denotes the absence of limitorship, a second order qualifier of counter-positive in an absential cognition. When absence of table is cognized, the absence of table-ness (which is the limitor or *avacchedakata*) is also cognized; **C** denotes the locus of the absence of counter-positive: locus and counter-positive are in a relational seam *(samsargamaryada)* which is either in *samjoga* (conjunction) or *samavaya* (inherence) relation.

C is called *pratiyogitaavacchedaka-sambandha* (Differences of delimiting relation of counter-positiveness).This delimiting relation of counter-positiveness is *pratiyogitaavccheda- daka sambanda,* i.e. in the relational seam, the cognition of absence of second order qualifier counter-

positiveness in the locus is marked by the abstract *pratiyogita- avacchedakata*. The relationship by which the counter-positive is negated in a locus, thus, is called *pratiyogitaavcchedaka sambanda.*

Thus the absence cognized in the **t** is under the mode of limitorship (as postulated in B) of the moved element. The presence of absential locus is marked by the limitorship or *avacchedakata*. Thus, there must be a locus for an absence that is the absential category, though the content of the *protiyogi* is moved. Some schools of *Nyaya* do not admit any delimiting relation of counter-positiveness in prior and posterior absence. Since, I have dragged the notion of *abhava* from an ontological category to the sentential category by considering the ontology of sentences, this extension needs some more revisions regarding the delimiting relation of counter-positiveness in a given sentence where prior and posterior absences occur. For me, in a sentence, whenever a phonological matrix is lacking, the category as a locus for that moved or destroyed counter-positive exists for absential cognition in a given sentence. If locus is there the delimiting properties of counter-positiveness is also there. Thus, in case of deletion, both the category and content is not hammered and erased, it is only the content that is absent from the category-ness (under the mode of which the counter-positive is absent) of locushood. Thus, though deletion is a posterior absence, it has the delimiting property of being counterpositive-ness, e.g., in case of *wh*-deletion, the locus of *wh* lacks the *wh* (where there is no overt *wh*) as well as *wh*-ness or is marked by the posterior absence of *wh* and *wh*-ness in its locus. The underlying *wh*-phrase undergoes *wh*-movement to COMP leaving an absence or trace behind and then *Wh*-deletion or posterior absence of *wh* occurs. The category persists by means of inherence-relation or *samavaya*. The application of universal Recoverabilty Condition is subject to the awareness of cognition of absence in the locus of the category. Nothing is recoverable if it is not subject to the absential cognition under the mode of limitors.

Thus the absential quantifier solves a crucial problem of whether a deletion erases category and content or only the contents of a category by positing the category as a locus of the counter-positive. However, there must be a distinction between a moved element and a deleted element. In case of moved element, the resident of t or **R**-expression is an instance of posterior absence,

which I want to call *uttara-abhava*, the subdivision which was not introduced by the old or new school of *Nyaya* and in case of deletion; I want to maintain the notion of destruction or *pradhamsabhava.* In course of deviating from the old NV, I am gaining strength from *Raghunatha* who did not admit prior or posterior absence as an absence and instead he postulated different types of *abhava* deviating from the older school.

3. CONCLUSION

This is, needless to say, an introductory paper where a simplified version of the theory of absence is introduced to strengthen the semantics of ECP and deletion. In this preliminary exposition, my main aim is to introduce the concept of *abhava* in the realm of linguistics so that the future work on the ECP may be benefited from this concept.

In the Western system of logic, the absential qualifier or quantifier is not used. If ECP needs to be elaborated in LF, it is necessary to deploy absential quantifier in the sentential calculus. Furthermore, to understand the nature of negation, the concept of *abhava* is also useful as *Raghunatha*, a 15 C *navyanaiyaika*, in his *Nan-vada*, explored the possibility of using *abhava* to understand the semantics of negative sentences. However, that is a different story.

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